Modes Of Engagement

When we encounter an object in the world, there are two senses in which we come to know it. Firstly, we have impressions such as the objects size, color, shape, & motion, which we correspond as within the object. The other sense is in the type of engagement that we confront the object with. We may examine the Apple, as a amateur biologist and/or philosopher would, and explain its qualities, the effects it has on other objects, it’s nutritional content, the context-free building blocks it has in common with all other objects in the world, or we may confront it from a quasi non-cognitive standpoint that simply views the Apple as sustenance. 

In this sense, the object becomes less of an object of examination and rather one that is meeting the needs of the subject acting on it. These two examples give light to the two distinct ways in which we come to make contact and knowledge of the world through a consciousness that is not complete in itself and thus depends on the qualities, effects, and metaphysical speculation of objects that seemingly exist outside of itself. 

I intend to delve into Lockean epistemology, its conception of primary, secondary, & tertiary qualities and their important relation to various corresponding modes of encounter that we find in human consciousness when dealing with any object whatsoever.

 Locke begins his analysis by distinguishing the various qualities that we find within objects and the knowledge supplied by them. Firstly, we have the underlying constitution of the object that is said, by Locke, to exist within the object itself. Qualities such as solidity, extension, figure, and/or motion and rest are all considered primary qualities according to Locke insofar as they are part of the very object’s constitution. Secondary qualities, on the other hand, are not directly part of the object’s constitution, but rather an accidental by-product of the qualities present in its constitution. These qualities include color, sounds, smells, tastes, etc. 

These qualities are dependent on the particular relations and arrangement of the microstructure by which the primary qualities manifest. The third type of quality, and one which will become quite important later on are Locke’s tertiary qualities. These qualities essentially take on the power to affect qualities in other objects. This is where object to object relations become present. Without tertiary qualities, there would be capacity for one body to have an effect on the qualities and activity of another body. Locke states that the power of the sun to melt wax is a tertiary quality. As one can see, the tertiary quality is dependent on both objects. The sun may have the power to melt the wax but only insofar as the wax has the power to be melted. (We don’t need to complicate the usage of the term power, it merely indicates the influence that the object can have on itself, its environment, a subject, or other objects). In a similar case, we may watch a brick break through a window by being thrown. 

Firstly we know that the brick has the potential to break the window with a certain amount of action potential. This means that (i)the brick can break objects similar in constitution to the window, and that (ii) by being used in a particular way, its effect can be strengthened or diminished according to the task at hand. Notice here, “task at hand”. Pay attention to how the brick, when considered under the notion of being used for something, is confronted and engaged with in a different way than if I were simply assessing the brick as a structure of its own. On the former hand, when engaging in its mode of “being used for something”, we focus more on the power that the object has on its environment, how it can be manipulated according to various tasks, so on and so forth. 

But in the other mode of engagement, we may simply view the brick in philosophical contemplation, as a “Thing”, as something that possesses an underlying constitution, consisting of the mysterious qualities of extension, solidity, motion & rest as well as various secondary qualities accessible via the senses. In this mode, we are looking at the object from a detached perspective, of which the power that it has on its environment is lastly considered.

 We are here the philosopher attempting to assess & organize the metaphysical and epistemological building blocks of the world and consciousness. Whereas the mode of engagement that is associated with the tertiary qualities of an object is not at all detached. In fact, when we engage in this mode, we are in what the phenomenologists will later call the Natural Attitude. In this mode, we are not reflective, thinking subjects, but rather a pre-reflective acting subject that is manipulating objects in order to reach the goals of projects designated by said subject. This is precisely why tertiary qualities are just as important as primary and secondary ones. If there were no effect that one object had on another, or no power that could influence a subject, there would be no utility of objects and therefore no projects or goals designated by a subject through objects. 

For instance, in writing this paper, I am using the object of a computer towards writing a paper over Lockean philosophy for my modern european philosophy class, in order to (a) not fail the paper, which would (b) fail the class, which would © affect my GPA, which would (d) affect my ability to pursue a career of my choosing, which would (e) make me a failure of my life project as it now stands. As we can see, the objects manipulated always have their end goal in the designation of the goals of the subject. In this sense, the object becomes less a “thing” and more of a function, The way in which I choose to define my goals as well as my self-concept affect the objects that I use, and the power I extrapolate from them. 

At the moment, even my so-called detached speculation on the epistemological/metaphysical of Locke’s philosophy is dependent on the fact that I have to write a graded paper for it. 

Hence, our modes of engagement with an object typically overlap in some type of way. The projects of a human subject are thus always bound up with the ways other entities become intelligible. As a result a large part of our definitions of objects, or our Nominal essences as Locke calls them, are dependent on how human consciousness engages in the world. The real essence of an object, according to Locke, is the underlying cause and/or structure that produces an object’s observable qualities, whether these be primary, secondary, or tertiary. Real essences only exist as unknown microstructures that are responsible for the qualities we see in an object that make it what it is. 

We never perceive or have an idea of these essences. But on the contrary, Nominal essences are the abstract ideas that we make to identify similar qualities shared by objects. Locke states, “ I would not here be thought to forget, much less to deny, that Nature in the Production of Things, makes several of them alike: there is nothing more obvious, especially in the Races of Animals, and all Things propagated by Seed. But yet, I think, we may say, the sorting of them under Names, is the Workmanship of the Understanding, taking occasion from the similitude it observes amongst them, to make abstract general Ideas, and set them up in the mind, with Names annexed to them, as Patterns, or Forms (Locke, 290). For example, identifying two separate substances as “brick”. The Nominal definition we may have for a brick may consist of a large or small rectangular block typically made from fried or sun dried clay of which is used in building. In this definition, we see two different sides. One that matches up to the object as itself, as its primary and secondary qualities.

 This is the object-in-itself, of which is complete, and lacks the ability to change itself according to itself. Accordingly, the first mode of detached engagement. Whereas the latter part of the definition corresponds to the second mode of encounter, one which involves the activity of the subject (e.g., building), and the power of the brick in relation to the various other objects of equipment that are used in the task of building something. This corresponds to human consciousness of which is incomplete, setting up tasks, curious regarding its place in the world; In summation, needing, desiring, wanting something outside of itself (Sartre’s being-for-itself). As we can see, in our Nominal definitions we extrapolate not only qualities but also powers and their relation to other powers. These powers, as one can see, become furthermore manipulated in various situations such that one power corresponding to one other power will never subsist. There is the brick’s power in relation to the window, or the brick’s power in relation to other bricks, or a house, etc. 

Thus our Nominal definitions consist of a baseline common denominator of power that the object may possess as well as room for it to be manipulated according to an innumerate number of needs, wants, and demands. In having both sides of this Nominal definition, and in correspondence, both sides of Being (in-itself & For-itself), we are able to not only identity and sort out a world of unending change and ambiguity into something intelligible and relatable, but also manipulate the powers of the objects in said world in order to meet the demands, wants, and needs of the for-itself mode of consciousness, which at times speculates on the nature existence, and at other times acts in the world according to its projects and needs. Bibliography: Locke, J. (2014). An essay concerning human understanding. Wordsworth Editions. Jones, J.-E. (2022, September 2). Locke on real essence. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/real-essence/ Sartre, J.-P., & Richmond, S. (2022). Being and nothingness: An essay on phenomenological ontology. Routledge. Solomon, R. C. (1972). From rationalism to existentialism.