Thus to remove the begging question, we must start on grounds that need not appeal to any transcendent object that would require a philosophical position on that which is outside of consciousness. Kant’s Thesis on the thing-in-itself is often seen as one of these appeals to a transcendent object (an object outside of experience). However, I think it is essential for Kant’s object constitution model to be put within a framework that does not posit the thing-in-itself as a transcendent object, but as an immanent logical relationship whereby it is still maintained as an object-of-consciousness.
Pre Reflective Consciousness takes perception as given. When we perceive a tree, we perceive a tree, not a collection of brown wood, green leaves, a life form, etc.,that then becomes Nominal, but as a tree immediately given. This is similar to Gestalt theorists who state that we perceive wholes before their parts, and that as wholes, they represent themselves in ways irrepresentable by its parts. Regardless, every perception shows a new holistic aspect. One of which could be divided into innumerate parts and relations.
It can be shown by moving around the tree with each perception flowing to the next, conceptually identified as the tree with the same identity as the previous perception. It can even be shown by reflecting about the tree, breaking it into parts and characteristics. This is an aspect of reflective consciousness.They can even be shown by unrelated mental states that still add or remove something to the perceptual synthesis of the tree.. Hence, we can still suspend judgment about an independently existing world where tree x in conditions of the phenomenal world is out of experiential and metaphysical range, all the while positing an object-in-itself of consciousness, and an aspect of that object-in-itself.
The various aspects, or presentations given to us by the object are mediated by a-priori categories, organizing it, in conjunction with the a-posteriori data as an object in itself. We do not perceive this tree merely as the concept of tree personified, but as individual substance, conjoined yet distinct from its concept. To perceive any object is to inhabit it by letting “drop” a background and a focal point. Within the focal point is the object and its horizon, whereas the background consists of objects whose horizons are blanked out for the purpose of the current inhabitant (Gurwitsch, 2009).
That is not to say that the horizons of other objects do not affect the horizon of others as say we would when focusing on a billiard ball with a cue stick in our hand reading to shoot. But such horizons are limited from the entire extent of conscious knowledge and possible awareness. The object-in-itself outside of consciousness, or the transcend object, that many philosophers have gathered soil trying to justify is thus replaced by an object-in-itself immanent of consciousness. This entails an object-in-itself that is entirely within the experience of consciousness, whether as an implicit logically conditioned shadow, or as an experienced aspect-of-object mediated by its conceptual horizons.
Try thinking about a red vase, for instance, and then think about you walking around that red vase, putting water in it, thinking about the vase as a work of art, knocking the vase off the table, analyzing the vase’s composition in a laboratory, measuring the vase, being cut by the red vase, having a shocking traumatic flashback while looking at the red vase. All of these represent different aspects that occur with the perception of the red vase. They indicate various modes of interaction by a subject.
In this sense, there is no one perception of the red vase that experiences all of the same content , nor could we know every possible perception that the red vase could expose, thus we could never know the entire content of the red vase, as every thought and experience of it reveals something new either within the content of the red vase or the subject. If we are cut by the red vase and become angry and hostile, a mental state attributable only to the subject, even that anger and hostility seep into the content of the red vase. Making it contemptible, or angry itself, or reproachable, etc..
Therefore, the subject and object distinction must also be collapsed in terms of discerning both to their own separate worlds within ordinary perception, or as Hussrel calls it, the natural attitude, insofar as an a-priori concept, as well as a-posteriori information are both are mediated by one another (Solomon, 1972). There are no a-priori concepts unmediated by the conditions of experience. Even the concepts of the understanding In Kant are still mediated by the conditions of synthetic unity. Even the concept Universal, within conditions of Thought, is experienced as a particular, individualized unity, separate and distinct from other concepts and sensations.
There is also no a-posteriori experience that is not mediated by Kant’s logical conditions and concepts of the understanding (Kant,1783). All in all, we have a distinction between the phenomenal object as an object-in-itself and as object-in-aspect which are both necessarily mediated by the conditions of experience. The object-in-itself is purely non-empirical, only deduced or given by the a-priori categories and transcendental concepts that posit identity to an object over and through its myriad experiential aspects (Kant, 1783).
That object-in-itself is idealized as distinct from any singular aspect but also distinct from its universal concept. The red vase mentioned earlier can immediately neither be entirely the red vase that I am seeing at this one moment, nor the concept of a red vase. Nor even, the concept of this particular red vase. We suppose in Thought, that there is information always missing to an object, leaving it never fully complete even if our knowledge of it as it is is fulfilled (Solomon, 2001).
If you asked me “do you have all the knowledge of the red vase” I would say “no”, for I am missing innumerate aspects such as physical properties, philosophical theories and modes, functional properties, possible states that the red vase could be in, such as broken. But if you asked me “do you see the red vase”, and I did in fact, I would say “yes”. One can see where the distinction lies.
I need not have the entire epistemic picture of an object to perceive it as an object-in-itself insofar as I posit it as a phenomenological relation between an aspect and its shadow, an in-itself . But again, this in itself is still an aspect.. When we use one, we use the other and we cannot conceive of one without the other.
This is the context whereby Kant’s synthetic processes occur, allowing us experience and knowledge of an object whatsoever. Kant states: “By synthesis, in its most general sense, I understand the act of putting different representations together, and of grasping what is manifold in them in one knowledge” (Kant,1783).. In the aforesaid arguments, we can see the parallel between Kant’s “one knowledge” and the aspect. The aspect is the product of Kant’s syntheses, that which is grasped as a singular unity.
In order for an experience to be an object of consciousness, for Kant it must be preconditioned by three syntheses. The first is the Synthesis of Apprehension in intuition, which is responsible for the organization of raw sensual input into spatial-temporal dimension. If consciousness is a stream that passess from one object to the next, whereof when we are aware of one object, or inhabiting it, we neglect all else that is not related. When I view a dog running around a park, my attention is not inhabiting a lamp, or the number 4, or even the beauty of the landscape. It is inhabiting the dog.
Each requires its own selective attention, albeit in incredibly fast and overlapping ways. But if Synthesis of apprehension did not occur with our senses, Kant argues that all would be a buzzing confusion of objects presented simultaneously, unable to separate one’s content from another either in space or in time. Synthesis of Reproduction in Imagination is the next, and tantamount and interlinked with the former. Synthesis of Reproduction is responsible for retaining earlier intuitions in order to retain the same, one representation, as well as spark an onset for other associations. This synthesis is responsible for allowing thought to transition.
Imagine drawing a line in your mind, for instance. Slowly trace the line. You will see that your mind, in tracing the line, continues along the same line. Every new second, we are not posed with a dot, then another dot, then another dot. Instead, it is one continuously smooth line. One then views the line not as parts, but as a singular whole organized along a temporal stream. In other words, this provides continuity for our presentations (Scott, 1994). This synthesis also has the product of maintaining associations among our thoughts, that then allow transition into new ones. The reproduction synthesis can be seen almost as constructing icebergs, whereof we view the top layer and its content thereby allowing us access to the implicit associations beneath.
Thinking of red oil paint, for instance, we are confronted with its color, its function, as well as implicit facts about its physical properties such as its texture. We associate it as milky, malleable. We do not denote a weight that measures 5 tons. It sounds absurd, but it is very peculiar and incredibly efficient that thoughts have appropriate, organized associations (Scott, 1994). They have certain empirical and a priori rules. Kant says, “This law of reproduction presupposes that the appearances themselves are actually subject to such a rule,and … accompany each other according to specific rules”(Kant, 1783). Without the a-priori grounding of an object and its properties, there could be no rules for empirical associations, for what will become part of an object’s content.
From the organization of the object via these two syntheses, we have then the Synthesis of Recognition in a concept. This synthesis is that which applies Kant’s Concepts of the Understanding: Quantity, Quality, Relation, Modality, and of course, separate from the Concepts of the Understanding (Kant, 1783), the specific, empirical concept that the object refers to. These concepts finalize the object as a singular, real, changeable thing that is no longer just a sum of parts, nor a collection of sense data. The concept has real implications for the possible presentations of the object.
We may see an organized material, “the red vase”, but until the concept has been applied, there is no linguistic, epistemic knowledge that can come from the vase. It is merely there, devoid of any conceptual information, and devoid of its organization into a real, singular object. The empirical concept allows us to impose the notion of Vase onto the red vase. Now, with this imposed, we can know about the red vase, a priori, without having to appeal to this red vase here. It takes part in the universal concept. I know that vases have a hollowed out interior that can hold things.
Therefore, upon even the slightest, most implicit perception of it, I have in mind this universal concept that allows me knowledge of the vase prior to any testing or interaction. Moreover, the concept is what allows for it to be represented into language. Me must therefore, as appropriate to language and conceptual distinction, separate the indefinite concept and the definite concept. The former refers to the universal, whereby the object in question is related to its universal companion, sharing only necessary features, the concept of hammer for instance. But the latter refers to also accidental qualities.
This hammer, for example, has many features that are not part of my concept of hammer. For instance, that it has a yellow circled engraving on it, or that its handle is smooth, or that it is used as a door-stopper. These qualities do not partake in my universal definition, however, they nevertheless occupy their own space as a definite, particular concept. Hence the Synthesis of recognition is twofold.
It organizes representations of an object by its universal concept, reaping the necessary information it can. But it also forms the concept of the particular object, this particular hammer, into its own distinct unity. All of these syntheses form the object-in-aspect.
For Kant, there is only the object-in-aspect produced by Syntheses and logical categories as well as the object-in-itself deduced a-priori via the conditions of thought that the mind undergoes. The object-in-itself, then, is not something independent of the mind, but that which exists as a necessary foundation for an aspect. Without presupposing an object-in-itself, an aspect is shallow, holding no weight.
But the structure of the mind will not allow such aspect to be presented without first supposing that such object has an 1) an infinite number of possible presentations, 2) immanent knowledge that eludes our current comprehension, and 3) a backdrop to which, when not perceived, still subsists.
These conditions for Kant are not ones within the object itself, as these 3 features are never actually experienced, but are products of the conditions that the mind has for allowing any possible experience whatsoever.
Hence, the ding-an-sich that Kant refers to need not refer to an object outside of consciousness, as referring to it puts us into epistemological uncertainty, but akin to the phenomenologists, as an object-in-itself-of-consciousness that remains as a logical placeholder for aspect variation.
References:
Gurwitsch, A., & Kersten, F. (2009). Studies in phenomenology and psychology.Springer.
Kant,. (1783). Prolegomena to any future metaphysics.
Scott, S. (1994). The synthesis of production and reproduction …
Solomon, R. C. (1972). From rationalism to existentialism.
Solomon, R. C. (2001). Phenomenology and existentialism. Rowman & Littlefield.